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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate that the works of Franz Kafka provide an exemplary 
resource for the investigation of ‘‘moral distance’’ in organizational ethics. We 
accomplish this in two ways, first by drawing on Kafka’s work to navigate the 
complexities of the debate over the ethics of bureaucracy, using his work to expand 
and enrich the concept of ‘‘moral distance.’’ Second, Kafka’s work is used to 
investigate the existence of ‘‘ethical violence’’ within organizations which entails acts 
of condemnation and cruelty purportedly in the name of ethics. Kafka’s work 
provides insight into the processes of moral distancing across a range of 
organizational contexts including highly formal as well as more informal settings. The 
paper enriches the concept ‘‘moral distance’’ by identifying the existence of 
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facilitators of moral distance beyond the mechanisms of formal rationality that have 
been the focus of existing studies. We argue that Kafka’s intense portrayal of ‘‘ethical 
violence’’ points to an aporia at the very heart of organizational ethics. 
 
Keywords: Moral distance, Ethical violence, Kafka, Bauman, Literature, 
Bureaucracy 
 
The aim of the present study is to develop a critical evaluation of the concept of 
‘moral distance’ in organizational ethics (Bauman, 1991; Du Gay, 1999, 2000).   
Existing studies of ‘moral distance’ have outlined a powerful critique of the ethics of 
bureaucracy and formal rationality (Bauman, 1991; Jones et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos 
and Fleming, 2008). This paper builds upon this work by identifying the existence of 
facilitators of ‘moral distance’ that go beyond the current focus of the debate on 
‘moral distance’ which has been narrowly restricted to a critique of the bureaucratic 
process. We draw upon the work of Kafka (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007) to navigate the 
key issues that have characterized the debate thus far, where Kafka’s work provides 
insights into processes of ‘moral distancing’ across a range of organizational contexts 
including highly formal as well as more informal settings. We thus show that ‘moral 
distance’ is not exclusively dependent on the formal rationality associated with 
bureaucracy, but is apparent even in informal personal relationships such as between 
friends and within the family, and may be even implicit in the notion of ethics itself. 
Drawing on Butler’s (2005) discussion of Kafka we also consider whether ethics itself 
3 
 
can become a facilitator of ‘moral distance’, where ethical principles can serve to 
justify condemnation and cruelty in the name of ethics.  
 
We argue that the work of Kafka is of importance to the study of organizational ethics 
because it provides a unique perspective on the emergence of moral ambiguities 
within organizations and particularly on the phenomenon of ‘moral distance’ 
(Bauman, 1991; Jones et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008). The concept of 
‘moral distance’ suggests that techno-rational forms of control have taught us to have 
ethical concerns only for those who are ‘near’ to us. This enables us to behave 
unethically towards others who are ‘far’ from us without guilt, where the formal 
rationality associated with early modernity functions as a ‘moral sleeping pill’ 
(Bauman, 1991). Kafka himself lived at the dawn of modernity and was one of the 
first to comment on modern institutions, such as bureaucracy, during their advent. The 
study of Kafka’s work can advance the on-going debate on ‘moral distance’ in two 
ways. First, it illustrates well that ‘moral distance’ does not only depend on formal 
rationality as originally suggested by Bauman (1991) but may also occur in other non-
bureaucratic institutions. Second, Kafka’s work allows us to identify facilitators of 
‘moral distance’ thereby extending the debate on ‘moral distance’ to include informal 
and non-bureaucratic relationships.  
 
Over the past two decades the use of literary sources and literary theory within 
management and organization studies research has grown dramatically (Burrell, 1997; 
Czarniawska, 1998, 1999; De Cock and Land, 2006; Gabriel and Giffiths, 2004; 
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Knights and Willmott, 1999; Land and Sliwa, 2009). Literature has been employed in 
a variety of different ways. Organizational scholars have proposed the use of literature 
for “complementing, illustrating and scrutinizing logico-scientific forms of reporting” 
(Czarniawska, 1999, p.23). The fictional aspect of literature can complement other 
empirical approaches to the study of organization by “extending the virtual tendencies 
of the given world…” (De Cock and Land, 2006, p.526). Others have recommended 
the use of literature as a “symptomatology of society” (Beyes, 2009) which can help 
management scholars to “engage reflexively with the lived experience of work” 
(Rhodes and Brown, 2005, p.397). Despite its development in the field of 
management and organization studies, literature has not received the same level of 
scholarly interest in business ethics research. When literature has been referred to in 
business ethics research, this has been overwhelmingly proposed as a tool for 
teaching, but has yet to be taken up as an object of research in its own right.  
 
The use of literature as a resource for teaching business ethics has been widely 
advocated (e.g. Chatterjee, 2000; Garaventa, 1998; McAdams and Koppensteiner, 
1992; Shepard et al., 1997; Small, 2006; von Weltzien Hoivik, 2009). Michaelson 
(2005, p.359) notes that literature is frequently used as a form of case-based teaching, 
enhancing the usual “war stories” from the business world “thereby expanding our 
vision beyond our parochial interests”. The benefits of teaching business ethics by 
drawing on literature are argued to be manifold. Classic literature is heralded as an 
“alternative source of insights” which “allow[s] the reader to observe a wide range of 
motives, emotions, and traits” (Garaventa, 1998, p.535). Chatterjee (2000, p.326) 
views literature as a “provocative instrument for raising a variety of enduring 
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ethics/values themes” such as moral growth, societal developments and moral 
imagination. Von Weltzien-Hoivik (2009, p.5) argues literature to be superior to the 
case study approach explaining that: “Better than business case studies, literature 
offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other 
professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and 
ambitions. Literary texts offer excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the 
organizational settings in which people find themselves.” Given the advocacy of 
literature as a rich source of material for teaching organizational ethics it is surprising 
that it has not yet received much scholarly attention as a research object in its own 
right (the few exceptions include Carson, 1994; McAdams, 1993; Michaelson, 2005). 
In this paper, we address this gap by arguing that the works of Franz Kafka offer a 
suitable starting point for developing such a project. 
 
Within the field of management studies the work of Franz Kafka has already attracted 
numerous commentaries on the relevance of his stories for management and 
organization studies (Beck Jørgensen, 2012; Feldman, 1998; Hodson, et al., 2012; 
Munro and Huber, 2012; Warner, 2007). For instance, Hodson et al. (2012) have 
drawn upon Kafka’s fiction to generate hypotheses about the nature of bureaucratic 
organization and then tested these hypotheses with reference to a library of 160 
ethnographic studies of real bureaucracies. This study revealed the characteristics of 
bureaucracy that we find in Kafka’s fiction are widespread in real world 
bureaucracies, particularly the ambiguity of rules, the existence of informal networks 
within organizations, and systemic corruption. Munro and Huber (2012) have drawn 
on Kafka’s work in a critique not only of bureaucracy but also of the existing theories 
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of organizational sensemaking. Several authors have commented that Kafka’s 
fictional accounts of organization serve as a useful counterpoint to enrich Weber’s 
(1991, 2005) exemplary study of the historical development of organizational forms 
(Beck Jørgensen, 2012; Warner, 2007). In the present paper we argue that Kafka’s 
work is particularly insightful in its portrayal of the ethical issues and conflicts that 
arise within organizations. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: we begin by discussing Weber’s (1991, 2005) 
ethics of bureaucracy, which provided grounds for the subsequent debate and critique 
of ‘moral distance’. Following from this we outline the different positions in this 
debate contrasting Bauman’s (1991) original concept of ‘moral distance’ with the 
critique of his argument by du Gay (1999, 2000, 2005), and successive attempts to 
develop the concept for business ethics (Jones et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos and 
Fleming, 2008). The argument then draws on Kafka’s work which complicates the 
notion of ‘moral distance’ in important respects, especially by questioning the role of 
formal rationality and widening the concept’s application to non-bureaucratic 
institutions. In the final section of the paper, we draw on Kafka’s (1999a, 1999b,  
2000, 2007) works to develop this concept further by discussing how ethical 
principles can themselves create ‘moral distance’ between people and lead to certain 
forms of ethical violence. We show that his work should not be reduced solely to a 
critique of bureaucracy but is concerned with a more fundamental critique of social 
institutions and organizations that are ostensibly meant to help us, and the 
questionable role of ethics itself within these institutions. 
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The Ethics of Bureaucracy 
 
Kafka’s name is as closely linked to the notion of bureaucracy as Weber’s, which has 
led scholars to speak of a “Kafka/Weber axis” (Warner, 2007, p. 1020). Weber (1991, 
2005) argued for the virtues of an impartial bureaucratic process, which provided an 
important impetus for the later debate on ‘moral distance’. In fact, according to Weber 
(1991) a certain level of bureaucratic distance is precisely what makes it possible for 
the bureaucrat to behave justly and impartially towards all those under his or her 
supervision. It is the actual effect of this bureaucratic distance that is later criticized in 
the debate on ‘moral distance’ (Bauman, 1991).  We will now explore those aspects 
of Weber’s (1991, 2005) argument that are relevant to the aims of our present inquiry. 
 
Bureaucracy is a system, which, according to Weber’s (1991, 2005) original work, 
should provide fairness and predictability through legal rationality and the proper 
ethos of the official (the Beamtenethos). In current management theory bureaucracy is 
commonly associated with convoluted rules and obstructive procedures and is 
occasionally referred to as being ‘kafkaesque’ (du Gay, 2000; Hodson et al., 2012). 
When going back to Weber’s (1991, 2005) original conception of bureaucracy it is, 
however, very much a system designed to positively foster democratic values such as 
justice, fairness and predictability. In fact, much of its ethical worth rests, for Weber, 
on its ignorance of personal traits such as gender, age or race, making all equal before 
the law and ensuring social justice. According to Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, 
principles serve as structuring elements, which guarantee predictability and an ethic 
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of fairness. Weber’s theory of bureaucracy relies not only on rules, but also on their 
interpretation in the spirit of legal authority. The individuals whose task it is to 
execute those principles develop a Beamtenethos, the ethos of the bureaucrat, which 
entails a sense of public duty.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to settle the dispute over whether Weber was a 
proponent or an opponent of bureaucracy. What we do know, however, is that Weber 
saw at least some potential for ethical behaviour in bureaucracy. The impersonality of 
bureaucratic rationality was, for Weber, a significant improvement over the previous 
system which was based on feudal privileges and traditional patriarchal rights 
bestowed by birth, superstition and custom. In Weber’s own words: 
 
“The administrative ideal is impartiality (‘sine ira et 
studio’) without any motives of personal or emotional 
influence, free from arbitrariness and unpredictability, and 
in particular, strongly formalistic according to rational 
rules without regard to respect of person: and where these 
are lacking the ideal [official] operates according to an 
objective outlook defined by effectiveness.” (Weber 
quoted in Whimster, 2004, p.134) 
 
Weber compared this form of legal authority with the charismatic authority of a leader 
and the traditional authority of customs and heritage (Spencer, 1970; Weber, 2005). In 
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comparison to other organizational forms, it is the impartiality of bureaucracy which 
offers some level of fairness. Not only does one set of rules apply to everybody, 
irrespective of class or income, but these rules also follow a legal and rational order, 
making the outcome of a bureaucratic process predictable for those subject to it. This 
view of bureaucracy, however, has not been shared by all. We will now discuss 
Bauman’s (1991) influential argument on the role of bureaucracy in the creation of 
what he called ‘moral distance’. 
 
’Moral distance’ and the Critique of Formal Rationality 
 
The concept of ‘moral distance’ was originally proposed by Bauman (1991) in his 
work on Modernity and the Holocaust. Bauman’s (1991) argument is that techno-
rational forms of control have taught us to have ethical concerns only for those who 
are ‘near’ to us. This enables us to behave unethically and without guilt towards those 
who are ‘far’ from us, where bureaucracy functions as a ‘moral sleeping pill’ 
(Bauman, 1991, p. 26). His idea of ‘moral distance’ was itself heavily influenced by 
Milgram’s (1963) study of obedience to authority, where he discovered that 
apparently normal people could be induced to inflict immense cruelty on others if 
they believed that a scientific authority had taken responsibility for that action. 
Bauman extended Milgram’s findings regarding the diffusion of moral responsibility 
to his inquiry into rational bureaucracy which he argued created the ‘moral distance’ 
that was a key precondition for the Holocaust (Bauman, 1991; Munro, 1998). 
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Bauman’s (1991) work on the Holocaust has been highly influential within the field 
of management studies (Burrell, 1997; du Gay, 2000) and more recent critical 
commentaries on the concept of corporate social responsibility (Roberts, 2003). The 
concept of ‘moral distance’ has also been picked up by scholars of business ethics to 
explain the development of unethical business practices (Jones et al. 2005; 
Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008). Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008) have 
explained the significance of ‘moral distance’ in terms of the role that organizations 
play in creating an ‘inhuman context’ which can transform people into unethical 
actors. This concept entails a critique of bureaucracy, which it is argued, creates a 
‘moral distance’ between the bureaucrats who implement the rules and the ‘victims’ 
of these rules. These victims are dealt with as faceless individuals within 
bureaucracies and are thus dehumanized and alienated. Jones et al. (2005, p.90) have 
described a number of strategies for the creation of ‘moral distance’ “to stretch the 
distance between an action and its consequences” such as the use of euphemistic 
language to dehumanize the victims of the process. Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 
(2008) have also proposed that ‘moral distance’ can be created by both temporal 
distancing of one’s actions from their consequences as well as the kind of structural 
distancing that is provided by an organization’s hierarchy. They explain that ‘moral 
distance’ can provide a vocabulary of rationalizations that help turn innocent 
bystanders into active participants in organizational misdeeds. The works of authors 
such as Milgram (1963) and Bauman (1991) are cited in support of this account of 
how unethical behaviour is an essential and systemic feature of the bureaucratic form 
itself.  
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However, the ‘moral distance’ hypothesis has itself received substantial critique from 
proponents of the ethical values of bureaucracy, most notably in the work of du Gay 
(1999, 2000, 2005). Du Gay (2000) argues that Bauman is wrong to see the Holocaust 
as a necessary outcome of bureaucracy, and in contrast, it was the corrupt influence of 
the Nazi regime that undermined much of its impersonal ethos, infecting it with 
cronyism, exceptionalism and a feudal-like loyalty to the Führer. Du Gay (2000) 
therefore rejects Bauman’s thesis that the bureaucratic mechanism serves to distance 
us from our moral sensitivity. He argues that Bauman has misread Weber who 
actually proposed a distinctively bureaucratic ethos grounded in the principle of 
impartiality. Du Gay (1999, p.579) explains that, “The ‘objectivity’ required of 
bureaucrats and bureaucratic decision making… entails a trained capacity to treat 
people as ‘individual’ cases, i.e. apart from status and ascription, so that partialities of 
patronage and the dangers of corruption might be avoided.” In this light, the 
bureaucratic ethos is not a corrupting, immoral force, but one designed around the 
requirement for impartiality and the “formal equality of treatment” (Du Gay, 1999, 
p.580). This procedural rationality may be seen as being ‘dehumanizing’ to the extent 
that it removes personal bias, and Weber (1991, p.216) freely admits this. However, 
this kind of dehumanization does not necessarily entail cruelty, but rather entails the 
subordination of one’s self to a procedural rationality, based on the principle of 
impartiality.  
 
Concluding the current state of the ‘moral distance’ debate, we might argue that du 
Gay (1999, 2000, 2005) is correct in his defence of bureaucracy as an impartial ideal 
type, but equally Bauman is correct in his critical assessment of the operation of 
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bureaucracies in practice. However, Bauman is not simply arguing that the ideals of 
bureaucracy are not achieved in practice, but that the mechanism of removing 
personal bias itself leads to the gas chamber rather than to a fair treatment. Recent 
empirical research has revealed that Bauman’s assessment of bureaucracy is not too 
far from reality. A review of over 160 ethnographic studies of real bureaucracies in 
the light of Kafka’s own pessimistic views has come to a similar conclusion finding 
that, “The genius of Kafka’s critique of bureaucracy lies not in identifying that such 
corrupt elements exist in formal organizations… but rather in the implicit argument 
that such features are a normal and foundational part of organizational functioning.” 
(Hodson et al., 2012, p.4). We will now contrast this debate with the stories of Kafka 
whose works illuminate a number of elements that are pivotal to the ‘moral distance’ 
debate. 
 
Dehumanization and ‘Moral Distance’ in Kafka 
 
In his accounts of bureaucracy Kafka (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007) problematized the 
ethical dimension of this organizational form because it can separate procedural 
bureaucratic rules from the values they were originally intended to serve. He 
highlighted an ambiguity at the heart of this form of organization. At its most extreme 
this has been observed in the Nazi death camps where bureaucracy was directed 
towards the destruction of human beings rather than towards their aid. In certain 
respects, Kafka’s critical stories may be seen to echo Bauman’s (1991) critique of 
bureaucracy and the exponents of his work within management studies and business 
ethics (Burrell, 1997; Clegg, 2006; Jones et al., 2005; ten Bos, 1997). Kafka’s tales 
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provide some excellent descriptions of the dehumanizing effects of the bureaucratic 
apparatus on the very individuals who are supposed to be their beneficiaries, and in 
this respect Kafka’s stories provide a literary counterpart to Bauman’s own critique of 
bureaucracy. And indeed, Bauman’s (1991) study of the dehumanizing effects of the 
Nazi bureaucracy makes direct reference to Kafka’s Trial, observing that within this 
regime a mere accusation effectively convicted the innocent and the guilty alike. 
However, such a reading of Kafka would be highly partial and reveal only one 
dimension of his ethics. In stories such as The Castle and The Trial, it is not 
bureaucracy per se that leads to immorality and corruption, but the informal networks 
of patronage that pervert the normal course of the bureaucratic apparatus. In this 
sense, Kafka would seem to have more in common with du Gay’s (2000) In Praise of 
Bureaucracy, which argued that Bauman’s assertion that bureaucratic processes are 
essentially immoral is misdirected.  
 
Kafka is perhaps the first great writer to comment on the phenomenon of ‘moral 
distance’ where the institutions that are supposed to help us, such as the law, confront 
us as an inhuman and alienating force. The most salient example of this concept in 
Kafka’s work is his remarkable essay The Metamorphosis (or The Transformation), 
where Gregor Samsa wakes up one morning to find himself transformed into a huge 
insect. The story recounts Gregor’s own shock at this unfortunate accident and the 
violent reaction of his family who first isolate him and eventually kill him. The 
process of ‘moral distancing’ begins even before his family become aware of his 
transformation when his boss comes to visit him to ask him to explain why he is late 
for work. When Gregor explains that he is sick his boss merely brushes away this 
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reason stating that, “businessmen are… often obliged for business reasons to shrug off 
some mild indisposition.” (Kafka, 1999a, p.83). However, Gregor’s alienation is 
greatly intensified when the family discovers the true nature of his condition and then 
gradually increase their cruelty towards him. Shortly before he dies with a rotting 
apple embedded in his inflamed back he overhears his sister explaining to their 
parents, “You must try to get rid of the idea that it’s Gregor. That’s our real disaster, 
that we’ve believed for so long. But how can it be Gregor… this animal plagues us. It 
drives away the lodgers, will obviously take over the entire apartment, and leave us to 
spend the night in the lane.” (Kafka, 1999a, p.120). There are fewer more eloquent 
descriptions of phenomenon of ‘moral distancing’ either in fiction or in empirical case 
studies. This story is also poignant because not so many years later the Jews were 
being vilified by the Nazis in Europe as vermin and insects and Kafka’s own sisters 
were to die in the concentration camp at Auschwitz.  
 
Existing accounts of ‘moral distance’ (Bauman, 1991; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 
2008) tend to emphasize the role that formal rationality and bureaucracy play in this 
process, but we can see from Kafka’s stories that ‘moral distancing’ can occur not 
only in bureaucracies but in a variety of social institutions, even in the family. Our 
study therefore goes beyond the current focus of the debate on bureaucratic rationality 
and extends the scope of the concept of ‘moral distance’ into other social domains and 
organizational forms. In Kafka’s The Trial, the process of ‘moral distancing’ begins 
with a mere accusation even before the formalities of the trial itself. Without 
disputing the force of the concept of ‘moral distance’ we argue that Kafka’s critique 
of the moral life of organizations extends far beyond this concept, questioning the 
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very possibility of organizational ethics as such. For Kafka the bureaucratic process is 
not the only way to create ‘moral distance’ between people, and it is more closely 
bound up with the cruel enforcement of ethical ideals than with bureaucracy per se. In 
fact, his stories give us examples of where moral principles are themselves used in a 
cruel fashion by moral individuals against others. This point has already been 
developed in the work philosophers and social theorists who have been critical of the 
social order, including Adorno (1997) and more recently Butler (2005), who have 
themselves been strongly influenced by Kafka’s works. 
 
Whilst we would not deny the force of the moral critique of bureaucracy by Bauman 
(1991) and others, following Kafka, we have extended the concept of ‘moral distance’ 
beyond the realm of bureaucracy to apply to ethics itself. In contrast to existing 
studies of ‘moral distance’ in organizational ethics, Kafka’s (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 
2007) works shows that this process can occur even in face to face relationships that 
do not necessarily require the bureaucratic separation and isolation of tasks. 
Suggesting that ‘moral distance’ does not rest on formal rationality alone raises the 
question as to what other factors or situations facilitate ‘moral distance’. We shall 
discuss what Kafka’s works have to contribute to answering this question in the 
following sections. 
 
Organizations and the Corruption of Transcendental Values 
 
16 
 
Kafka (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007) shows us how ‘moral distance’ can occur in 
relations in which formal rationality is not its primary cause. His stories and novels 
also present other facilitators of ‘moral distance’. In this section we will discuss two 
such facilitators. The first theme we identify here concerns the disconnection of 
organizational rules and principles from their original purpose and the transcendental 
values on which they were initially based. The second theme deals with the corruption 
of formal rules by informal rules, which echoes du Gay’s (1999, 2000, 2005) 
argument concerning the corruption of bureaucracy as a root cause for the power of 
the Nazi regime. Both facilitators show how ethical bureaucratic values become 
corrupted in practice. 
 
Weber’s (1991, 2005) conception of Beamtenethos focuses on the ethical attitude of 
the bureaucrat. Kafka complements this view by emphasizing the perspective of those 
subject to bureaucratic procedures. In contrast to Weber, Kafka shows that the values 
underlying bureaucracy exist primarily in the expectations of the protagonists, which 
are over-optimistic and frequently pursued with ruinous consequences. The mismatch 
of expectations with reality points us to an underlying problematic in Kafka’s 
conception of organization, which can be broadly understood in terms of the 
necessary corruption of transcendental values. No matter how earnestly higher values 
are pursued within Kafka’s stories, they are only ever realized in a partial and 
corrupted form. This can be seen, for instance, when Josef K. is arrested at the 
beginning of The Trial. He does not comprehend how this could have happened, 
because – as Kafka (1999b, p.7) tells us in the very first sentence – “without having 
done anything wrong he was arrested”. This abrupt interruption of his daily life 
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baffles K. because he “lived in a country with a legal constitution, there was universal 
peace, all the laws were in force; who dared seize him in his own dwelling?” (Kafka, 
1999b, p.10). This is only the start of an ultimately fatal series of actions by K., which 
are invariably followed by the contradictory measures of those on whose help he is 
reliant. As Josef K. is continually presented with the possibility of escape the reader’s 
sense of hopelessness is increasingly compounded as they are led from one false hope 
to another. However, we can see a basic misconception in K.’s expectations because 
he mistakenly presumes the existence and eventual success of transcendental values 
such as justice, fairness and respect. Adorno (1997, p.270) emphasized exactly this 
problem in his commentary on Kafka’s work when he observed that, “The heroes in 
the Trial and the Castle become guilty not through their guilt—they have none—but 
because they try to get justice on their side.” Higher principles thus serve as a 
seductive device in drawing naïve victims further into the corrupt bureaucracy, rather 
than serving as substantive values that will ever materialize in actual practice. In stark 
contrast to the Weberian ideal, Kafka’s parables show that when put into practice they 
become corrupted and the original ideals remain necessarily abstract and ultimately 
transcendental. 
 
One of the key problems that Kafka raises is that the rules are themselves often 
unclear and ambiguous. In The Castle it takes a long time for K. even to begin to 
grasp the various organizing principles of the castle, some of which are formal and 
others rather informal relating to the villagers’ everyday dealings with the castle. 
Likewise in the novel Amerika, Karl begins to appreciate a whole world of informal 
rules that may be subject to sanction, where he reflects that, “There was probably no 
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actual rule…, but that was only because the unimaginable was not expressly 
forbidden.” (Kafka, 2007, p.114). A key mechanism that facilitates the operation of 
formal systems of organization within his stories is the role of informal networks of 
communication. For instance, in The Trial the Defence is not even a part of the formal 
legal system: “… the Defence was not actually countenanced by the Law, but only 
tolerated… Strictly speaking, therefore, none of the Advocates was recognized by the 
Court…” (Kafka, 1999b, p.128). If you want a defence at all, then you must by 
necessity appeal to informal means to obtain it. Kafka’s protagonists are often 
confronted with formal systems of organization that are realized only by means of an 
evasive, sometimes imaginary informal system that functioned through a widespread 
complicity. 
 
Another example of the crucial role of informal systems of organization is the social 
exclusion of Amelia and her family in The Castle. After declining a sexual offer by 
the official Sortini, the townsfolk push her family’s business into bankruptcy, her 
father towards insanity and they stigmatize her and her family in fear of retribution by 
the officials of the castle. However, no official or unofficial attempts to exact 
punishment are made by the members of the castle, casting doubt over whether there 
is any genuine reason for the villagers’ anxiety beyond their own paranoia. Women 
play a distinctive role in this informal network where K. becomes engaged to Frieda 
because ‘spider that she was, she had connexions of which nobody knew’ (Kafka, 
2000, p. 286). In Kafka’s stories, the formal and informal systems of organization are 
often very closely interwoven. The important role of these informal systems has the 
effect of amplifying both the power and the extent of the formal systems of 
organization, where for instance, in The Trial, there is nothing outside of the trial, 
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which appears to be omnipresent, extending throughout all aspects of social life. The 
informal system appears to be necessary for the functioning of the formal one, but at 
the same time, it has a corrupting effect upon the formal system. 
 
The way in which rules become distorted and corrupted in practice has been the 
subject of some of the earliest research within organization theory into the latent 
functions of rules and other ‘bureaucratic dysfunctions’ (Gouldner, 1954; Merton, 
1957). The detachment of rules from their ostensible purposes can be found in this 
early research, but it found its classic expression in Weber’s (2005) distinction 
between Dienstwissen and Fachwissen. Whilst the former refers to knowledge of 
bureaucratic rules and procedures and how they can be interpreted and manipulated 
by the bureaucrat, the latter refers to forms of expert scientific knowledge, i.e. the 
specific technical content with which the bureaucracy deals, be it educational, legal, 
economic or other (Weber, 2005, p.219-225). The bureaucratic system perpetuates 
itself and produces its own rules, which it needs to function, but there is a tendency 
for these bureaucratic rules to become disconnected from the original purposes and 
higher ideals of the institution. In Weberian terms we might call this a corruption of 
the ethos of the bureaucrat where values remain formal abstractions and are not 
translated in actual practice. This is not simply a literary conceit on Kafka’s part and 
Barker (2002) has observed that even business ethics programmes can become 
preoccupied with rule following, lacking a genuine sensitivity to ethical concerns. 
 
In Kafka’s stories actual organizations never realize the transcendental values upon 
which they are based. This eternal mismatch results in the struggle in which Kafka’s 
characters are continually engaged. However, Kafka’s characters fail to understand 
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the impossibility of a reconciliation between ideal values and their realization. It is 
exactly this mismatch which draws K. from one authority to another, in the hope that 
he will eventually find a way out of the injustice of his situation. Kafka thus abandons 
the attempt to reconcile transcendental values and their practical materializations, 
while at the same time acknowledging the human motivations that lead us to appeal to 
these values in order to make sense of our social world. In practice, the bureaucratic 
organization becomes corrupted by i) the detachment of its own rules from its original 
purpose (e.g. justice), and ii) by the informal system upon which it is reliant for its 
realization. Both forms of corruption undermine the ethical potential of bureaucracy 
and formal rationality more generally. Using Kafka’s work, we have shown that 
formal rationality may not be the root cause for ‘moral distance’ and that the personal 
interpretation of rules has distorting effects related to the detachment of rules from 
their ostensive goals and their corrupt application by cronyism. As we shall now 
demonstrate, Kafka’s stories have the potential to extend this insight by discussing 
more extreme forms of the corruption of transcendental values when ethical rules and 
principles are used to justify unethical behaviour. 
 
Ethical Violence and the Tyranny of Principle 
 
Many of Kafka’s works show how the formal rational rules of bureaucracy can be 
corrupted and can facilitate ‘moral distance’ (especially Kafka, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 
2007), but Kafka’s stories highlight that ethical principles are also subject to the same 
corrupting forces. In what could be called the ‘tyranny of principle’ Kafka anticipates 
the concept of ethical violence developed by Butler (2005). In the novel Amerika, a 
recurrent theme is the disproportionately harsh punishments that are meted out to Karl 
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Roßmann when he breaks organizational rules and other commitments. When Karl 
decides to spend a night at the house of one of his rich uncle’s business partners, he 
inadvertently upsets his uncle who decides to abandon Karl forever. Karl had already 
been exiled by his own parents from his home in Europe after an unfortunate affair 
with a maid, and is then rejected by his uncle in America, not so many days after he 
had first met him. This is especially tragic as his uncle was his sole stable point of 
reference in the United States. The uncle’s letter to Karl justifies this drastic decision 
in the following way: “… I am a man of principle. That is a very disagreeable and a 
very sad thing, not only for those around me, but for myself as well, however, I owe 
everything I am to my principles, and no one has the right to ask me that I deny 
myself out of existence …” (Kafka, 2007, p.62). As is so often the case in Kafka’s 
stories, principles overrule compassion in the treatment of the infraction of rules – 
even when these are only perceived infractions.  
 
Precisely the same theme can be found in the story In the Penal Colony where Kafka 
teaches us how the rule of principle can have drastically violent consequences. In this 
short story a peculiar kind of apparatus is described, which serves no other purpose 
than the preservation of the tyranny of principle. It is a killing machine designed to 
execute death sentences, which uses a large array of needles to inscribe a judgment on 
the body of the condemned, eventually killing them after a period of prolonged agony. 
After six hours the criminal begins to decipher the lethal message etched into him, 
which describes the nature of his crime. The officer tells us that a glorious 
enlightenment dawns upon the condemned man. This is the tyranny of pure principle 
as no reform of the prisoner is intended the prisoner cannot learn from his mistakes 
nor take any corrective action since he has been condemned to die. Whereas the 
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spectacular punishments and public executions of past times served as a warning to 
other potential criminals, in this story a scene is portrayed in which the witnesses 
simply enjoy the show. No moral lesson whatsoever can be taken into the future – it is 
even said to be hard “to decipher the script with one’s eyes”, so a witness can 
understand nothing of the nature of how justice is served. Kafka does not stop there. 
When a traveller who has been asked to give an account of the penal colony tells the 
officer that he will recommend that the use of the apparatus be discontinued, the 
officer who is responsible for the executions puts himself into the machine, killing 
himself and destroying the machine at the same time. When the traveller looks into 
the dead officer’s eyes he finds that “no sign was visible of the promised redemption; 
what the others had found in the machine the officer had not found […]” (Kafka, 
1999a, p.166). In In the Penal Colony, the enforcement of the law is reduced to a 
cruel ceremony in which the rule of principle reforms people simply by killing them.  
 
Kafka’s conception of justice raises an important point concerning the impossibility 
of the realization of transcendental values within organizations. When discussing In 
the Penal Colony, Bennett (1994, p.659f) notes that “[b]y depicting the perfect 
realization of the desiderata of judicial closure, Kafka’s story again foregrounds the 
internal multiplicity and idiosyncrasy of the judge and points to the dissonance 
between him and any final judgement”. The officer in the story dreams of a perfect 
penal colony in which justice is done to the guilty automatically, excluding any 
possibility of human intervention or human error. What the officer fails to see is that 
in his colony everybody is immediately perceived as guilty. Ironically, what is 
excluded in this system is the point of entry of the value of justice into the judicial 
system, as Bennett (1994, p.659) explains, “Kafka brings the dream of closure to 
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fulfilment in a legal system with a single judge who refuses to doubt an accusation 
and who heeds only one of his internal voices, the one that shouts ‘guilty as 
charged!’”. We find another revealing example of this phenomenon in The Trial, 
when K. is called to his first hearing and by delivering an elaborate and emotional 
explanation of his particular circumstances he is told that in so doing he has 
effectively put paid to his chances of being given a fair hearing later in the 
proceedings. Kafka’s judges are not the careful interpreters of transcendental values, 
such as justice or fairness, but the merciless and sometimes idiotic enforcers of a 
bureaucratic mechanism. 
 
Butler (2005) has explained the moral significance of Kafka’swork in terms ethical 
violence, where ethics itself entails that cruelty be inflicted upon either oneself or 
another. She explains this concept in the following way: “in the name of ethics we 
(violently) require that another do a certain violence to herself, and do it in front of us 
by offering a narrative account or issuing a confession…” (Butler, 2005, p.64). 
Violence is seen as a means by which an individual can achieve the level of self-
mastery necessary for becoming moral. Kafka provides us with numerous stories 
where ethical violence is clearly directed by a purportedly moral actor against a 
supposedly immoral one. In particular Butler (2005) highlights the role played by 
moral condemnation in the execution of ethical violence. She agues that, “… 
condemnation is very often an act that not only ‘gives up’ on the condemned but 
seeks to inflict a violence upon the condemned in the name of ‘ethics.’ Kafka offers 
several instances of how this kind of ethical violence works.” (Butler, 2005, p.46). 
Butler (2005) discusses the example of Georg in Kafka’s story The Judgment, where a 
man is driven to kill himself to fully demonstrate his love for his father. We can find 
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ethical violence in other works of Kafka as well. In Amerika it happens when Karl’s 
uncle, “a man of principle” disowns him because he was late to a meeting. In The 
Trial, the ethical violence is the trial itself, which constitutes a form of cruelty carried 
out on the innocent and guilty like. In The Trial, the best that even an innocent man 
can hope for is perpetual judgment. The story In the Penal Colony takes the logic of 
condemnation even further, where the sentence inevitably kills those subject to it, 
eventually the prison warden himself. In some of these stories, such as The Trial and 
In the Penal Colony it appears that there is some ‘moral distancing’ at work, where 
those judged under the legal mechanism are utterly helpless and incapable of 
defending themselves. However, the concept of ‘moral distance’ only captures part of 
Kafka’s cutting critique of the social order. For instance in his stories Amerika, The 
Judgement and The Metamorphosis, the perpetuators of ethical violence are not 
corrupt bureaucrats, but are close family members. Kafka ably demonstrates how 
‘moral distance’ not only occurs in situations in which formal rationality plays a role 
but also when transcendental values become corrupted in their actualization in any 
setting. This also holds true for ethical principles which can be used to legitimate 
‘ethical violence’. 
 
The tyranny of principle is so potent within Kafka’s ethics that the identity 
construction of many characters is based solely on these principles. The relationship 
between ethics and identity work has already been developed by Kornberger and 
Brown (2007). This shows very clearly the way that ethical principles can become an 
important discursive resource for identity work, however, it does not explore the 
potentially tyrannical aspects of these kinds of relationships. If the principle is seen to 
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fail, then so do the human beings invested in it. This is why the disciples of the 
apparatus, like the officer, feel that it must be protected by any means, not only 
because of transcendental values like justice, but because to accept any fault would 
undermine their entire being. This point finds exemplary expression in the parting 
words of Karl’s uncle in Amerika: “... I owe everything I am to my principles, and no 
one has the right to ask me that I deny myself out of existence...” (Kafka, 2007, p.62). 
Kafka’s extraordinary conception of ethics is not aimed narrowly as an attack of the 
bureaucratic ethos, but is aimed at ethics itself. It is the ‘man of principle’ who 
tyrannizes over others whether in the office or in his own family. 
 
For the debate on ‘moral distance’ Kafka’s work has significant implications. As we 
have shown, du Gay’s (1999, 2000, 2005) point that formal rationality entails some 
potential for ethical behaviour cannot be easily discarded. Neither, however, can be 
Bauman’s argument that in practice bureaucracy has led to unethical behaviour. 
Weber (1991, 2005) was aware of this problem of the actualization of the virtues of 
bureaucracy when emphasizing the ethos of the bureaucrat (Beamtenethos). Kafka 
provides us with in-depth discussions of the actualization of transcendental values. 
His stories show that ‘moral distance’ can occur even in situations in which ethical 
principles are evoked. The present analysis extends the original debate on ‘moral 
distance’, which was restricted to a discussion of the role of formal rationality in the 
development of unethical behaviour (Bauman 1991; du Gay, 1999, 2000, 2005). Our 
analysis supplements the existing debate by moving beyond bureaucratic mechanisms 
of moral distancing and identifying additional facilitators of ‘moral distance’ related 
to the corruption of values by informal rules and slavish adherence to principles. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have discussed selected works of Kafka (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007) 
and their implications for the current debate in business ethics on ‘moral distance’. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we have shown how ‘moral 
distancing’ can take place across a range of organizational contexts including more 
informal settings as well as the highly formal. Using Kafka’s work we have shown 
that formal rationality is not the only facilitator of ‘moral distance’ and that such 
distance can also be created within even close personal relationships. Second, we 
have identified the existence of facilitators of ‘moral distance’ that go beyond the 
bureaucratic process such as an informal system of rules and the disconnection of 
rules from their intended transcendental values. By drawing on Butler’s (2005) 
discussion of Kafka we have shown that, at the most extreme, ethics can itself become 
a facilitator of ‘moral distance’, where ethical principles can serve to justify cruelty 
and condemnation in the name of ethics. By drawing on literary resources for making 
these two contributions, we have shown that literature is not merely a teaching tool 
for organizational ethics but is an important object of research in its own right. 
 
The argument of the paper acknowledges the importance of previous ground-breaking 
research into the concept of ‘moral distance’ by Bauman (1991). However, this paper 
suggests that it is not enough to simply criticize bureaucracy and we thus call for 
further research into facilitators of ‘moral distance’ and ethical violence in non-
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bureaucratic organizations and in more informal forms of organizing. The concept of 
‘moral distance’ is an important direction for future research into business ethics and 
can be further developed by drawing upon both empirical case studies and literary 
sources. There has been a dearth of empirical research into the existence of ‘moral 
distance’ in non-bureaucratic organizational forms and future research might usefully 
explore the presence of such processes in more flexible and informal kinds of 
organization. For instance, the recent financial crisis would provide fertile grounds for 
the investigation of entrepreneurs and experts who have flouted professional 
guidelines perceiving themselves to be apart and above others in terms of their 
expertise, wealth or social status (Lewis, 2006; Ferguson, 2012).  
 
The development of Kafka’s work as a research object for organizational ethics is part 
of the small yet growing stream of business ethics research which explores the 
potential of literature in contributing to research on business ethics (Carson, 1994; 
McAdams, 1993; Michaelson, 2005). While using literature as a resource for teaching 
business ethics is more commonplace, deploying literature as a means of research is a 
less developed project. In one of the most extensive contributions to this debate 
Michaelson (2005) argues that literature might stimulate our moral imagination and, 
crucially for him, “expand our vision beyond our parochial interests” (p.359, 360, 
371). Others have proposed that novels such as Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby 
(McAdams, 1993) and Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (Carson, 1994) can be used 
to challenge and improve the quality of the readers’ moral thinking. In the present 
paper we have looked to Kafka’s (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007) texts to investigate the 
dark side of organizations and to access the lifeworlds of the victims of injustice 
28 
 
within organizations. We have thus shown how Kafka’s work can help us to navigate 
and extend the debates on ethical violence and ‘moral distance’ within organizations. 
 
We understand our study as a step towards exploring the potential of literature as a 
resource for research on business ethics, which opens up a number of directions for 
future research. In particular, the paper poses research questions concerning the role 
of ‘moral distance’ in organizations as well as the investigation of literature as an 
object of study for organizational ethics. The works of important authors such as 
George Orwell, Joseph Conrad and Joseph Heller yield insights into the moral 
ambiguities of modern forms of organization and the kinds of moral conflicts that 
they engender. Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 is in many respects comparable to Kafka in 
its moral critique of bureaucracy. His conception of the Catch 22 may be particularly 
suitable for opening up an inquiry into those kinds of rules that have a strong 
corrupting tendency, which rather than serving as a guide to responsible action, 
function instead as a platform for the development of morally ambiguous situations 
and intractable moral conflicts. The issue of ‘moral distance’ and ethical violence, 
which we have explored here, is also apparent in the work of other noteworthy 
novelists such as Joseph Conrad. Conrad’s accounts of early colonial business 
ventures reveal the civilizing mission of Western business to be little more than the 
murderous plunder of weaker countries by the stronger. Conrad forces us to ask to 
what extent is the moralizing vision of liberal capitalism a mask for something rather 
less innocent? Here we see the ‘virtual tendencies’ of fiction explode into the actual 
world, where Conrad’s own experience of piloting a river boat down the Congo in 
1890 served as a basis for his shocking descriptions of colonial business affairs in his 
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novel Heart of Darkness. Conrad himself commented that, “Heart of Darkness is 
experience… pushed a little (and only very little) beyond the actual facts of the case.” 
(quoted in Hochschild, 2006, p.143). In our own paper we have revealed similar 
moral ambiguities through an investigation of the evolution of incidents of ethical 
violence within Kafka’s distinctive account of organizational life. Ultimately, by 
extending the ‘virtual tendencies’ (De Cock and Land, 2006) of the given world 
through drawing on works of literature business ethics scholars can extend our insight 
into on-going moral debates and offer fresh views and reflections. 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
Aporia: A philosophical puzzle or impasse.   
Beamenethos: The ethos or attiude of a bureaucrat to interpret formal rules faithful to 
their intentions as outlined by Weber (2005). For him, the interpretation of rules 
should not be influenced by the personal desire of the bureaucrat or the appreance, 
traits, etc. of the person subject of the rule but should always rest on the values and 
intentions underlying the rule.  
'Moral Distance': According to Zygmunt Bauman's (1991, p.192) pioneering study, " 
moral inhibitions do not act at a distance. They are inextricably tied down to human 
proximity. Commitment of immoral acts, on the contrary, becomes easier with ever 
inch of social distance…. With the growth of distance, responsibility for the other 
shrivels, moral dimensions of the object blur, till both reach vanishing point and 
disappear from view."   
Moral Ambiguity: situations in which the ethical way to behave is not easy to 
identify. In Kafka's stories the protagonists often lack crucial information for deciding 
which further action would constitute the ethically most desireable option thus 
creating morally ambiguous situations. 
Sine ira et studio: a Latin term meaning 'without anger and fondness'. Weber (1991, 
p.215-216) makes specific reference to this idea when discussing the 'fully developed' 
bureaucracy that is governed by formal rules, 'eliminating from business love, hatred, 
and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.'    
 
 
